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As practitioners and scientists reflect on what can be learned from COVID, we argue that cultural defaults—commonsense, rational, and taken-for-granted ways of thinking, feeling, and acting —played an important role in how countries responded to the pandemic, and help explain why the United States suffered 4-6 times more deaths per 100,000 people compared to the East Asian countries of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Drawing on a recent review and theoretical integration, we describe six pairs of contrasting cultural defaults that were common in how the U.S. and some East Asian nations responded to the pandemic: (1) optimism-uniqueness vs. realism-similarity, (2) single vs. multiple causes, (3) expression of high vs. low arousal emotions, (4) influ-ence-control vs. wait-adjust, (5) personal choice-self-regulation vs. social choice-social regulation, and (6) pro-motion vs. prevention. These historically-derived defaults are often outside of individual awareness, but are reflected in and reinforced by institutional practices and policies, the media, and everyday interactions. They are infused with cultural values, understood as the “right way” to be or behave, and are adaptive in their respective contexts. Importantly, both constellations of cultural defaults are viable depending on the problem to be solved. We then provide six specific ways in which public health officers might productively consider these and other cultural defaults when preparing for the next crisis and planning how to effectively motivate people to protect their own and others’ health. Our hope is to facilitate efforts to include a focus on culture within the scope of the social determinants of health and to encourage more partnerships between behavioral scientists and public health practitioners. Recognizing the cultural defaults of the various “publics” they seek to protect is critical as U.S. public health officers aim to promote health for all, a significant and complex challenge in the increasingly individualistic U.S. 

Five years after the beginning of the COVID pandemic, one thing is clear: The East Asian countries of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea outperformed the United States in responding to and controlling the outbreak of the deadly virus. Although multiple factors likely contributed to this disparity, we propose that the culturally linked psychological defaults (“cultural defaults”) that pervade these contexts also played a role. Cultural defaults are commonsense, rational, taken-for-granted ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. In the United States, these cultural defaults include optimism and uniqueness, single cause, high arousal, influence and control, personal choice and self-regulation, and promotion. In Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, these defaults include realism and similarity, multiple causes, low arousal, waiting and adjusting, social choice and social regulation, and prevention. In this article, we (a) synthesize decades of empirical research supporting these unmarked defaults; (b) illustrate how they were evident in the announcements and speeches of high-level government and organizational decision makers as they addressed the existential questions posed by the pandemic, including “Will it happen to me/us?” “What is happening?” “What should I/we do?” and “How should I/we live now?”; and (c) show the similarities between these cultural defaults and different national responses to the pandemic. The goal is to integrate some of the voluminous literature in psychology on cultural variation between the United States and East Asia particularly relevant to the pandemic and to emphasize the crucial and practical significance of meaning-making in behavior during this crisis. We provide guidelines for how decision makers might take cultural defaults into account as they design policies to address current and future novel and complex threats, including pandemics, emerging technologies, and climate change. 

Well-being 2030 has become the latest rationale for the OECD’s education work. This vision has given rise to new assessments of student well-being beginning with PISA 2015. The OECD, recognising the problems of PISA 2015, conceptualised a wider student well-being construct in PISA 2018, and attempted to measure ‘students’ feelings’. However, analyses of the OECD’s affective turn reveal major problems remain. Our critique is empirically underpinned by an innovative analytical strategy: comparing PISA 2018 student questionnaire translations across different ‘economies’ that use the same written language (China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan). Our analyses confirm that the OECD imagines a cultural and context-free world, one in which translation and measurements are simply technical problems to be engineered, rather than deeper ‘problems’ of worldviews that require attunement. To encourage the OECD to recognise these differences in its future assessments, we offer starting points from recent research in cultural psychology.